IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 973

International Court of Justice

H0973-0002

Com A.
Take 2-Pg. 5.
Meehan
22 July June
Reinhardt.

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY FOR THE DEFENSE OF ORGANIZATIONS, TAKEN BEFORE A COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED 13 MARCH 1946.

22 June 1946

(THE COMMISSION CONVENED AT 1130 HOURS.)

COMMISSIONER:

Colonel A. M. S. Neave

O. K. W.

LT. GENERAL HANS REINHARDT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:

COLONEL NEAVE: What is your name?

THE WITNESS: Hans Reinhardt.

COLONEL NEAVE: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath.)

COLONEL NEAVE: You may sit down.

Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal have not yet made a decision on the point you mentioned. just now I understand they will discuss it this afternoon.

DIRECT EXAMINATION.

COLONEL NEAVE: Dr. Laternser, you can tell us what this witness is going to bring out. Do you have a copy of the application now?

H0973 - 0003

DR. LATERNSER: I wish to interrogate the witness on the following:

1) The military leaders did not agree with the aims of the NSDAP.

2) They took no part in the preparation of aggressive wars.

3) There was no conspiracy or participation in crimes as given in Article 6.

4) It was impossible to resign or to alter the system.

DR. KEMPNER: Mr. Commissioner, I want to raise the question of culmative evidence. This is exactly the third time that we have interrogated witnesses about the same topics. We had the same statements in the case of Field Marshall VonRundstedt, General Von Leeb and this witness.

COLONEL NEAVE: Thank you for bringing it this point here, Dr. Kempner, as I was just going to raise it myself.

DR. LATERNSER: I cannot be said in advance whether evidence is culmative or not.

COLONEL NEAVE: The question I am asking you is this. Is this witness going to bring out entirely new aspects of the matters which you say you wish to prove and is he not going to repeat what the others said?

DR. LATERNSER: Not at all, Mr. Commissioner. The answer to the question whether the evidence is culmative can only be decided as to every individual question.

COLONEL NEAVE: I am simply asking you a question. Of course, you are right but the matters you state the witness will bring out have been covered before, If this witness is going to draw attention to an entirely new aspect of the same matters, then of course the commission will

H0973-0004

hear him. Please bear in mind that we have only two weeks longer for the hearings.

DR. LATERNSER: Please judge each individual question.

COLONEL NEAVE: Yes.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q Witness, what was your last grade in service?

A General.

Q Were you a member of the General Staff?

A Yes.

Q What was your function?

A I joined the General Staff during the first World war in 1916. I then was a member of the General Staff until the end of the World War. I then alternated between duty with the General Staff and on the front. Twice I was with the General Staff with the OKH in Berlin. From 1927 to 1931 I was a teacher and the director of the training course for assistant leaders. From 1933 to 1937 I was the chief of the Army Training Section in the Supreme Commander of the army. Since 1937, I was no longer a member of the General Staff.

Q What was your function in the Polish campaign?

A I was a commander of the 4th Panzer Tank Division.

Q What was your rank.

A At that time the rank was Major General.

Q When did you become Commander in Chief?

H0973 – 0005

Com. A.
Take 2-Pg. 8.
Meehan
22 July June
Reinhardt.

A In March, 1942, I became the commander of the 3rd Panzer Tank Army.

Q What was your last function?

A On the 16th of August, 1944, I was charged with the commanding job of Army Group Center. From this function, I was deposed in January, 1945. Since then I have not been in active service.

Q While you were in the supreme command of the army or later when you had command of troops, did you become acquainted with any unified agressive plans of the Fuehrer?

A No, never.

Q Did you hear by any chance from conversation of such transactions?

A No.

Q What was your position in November of 1937?

A In November of 1937 I was the commander of the Rifle Brigade of the First Tank Division.

Q As you know, Hitler called a conference in the beginning of November, 1937 with the commanders of the different army groups. Hitler presented his plans for the future to the commanders.

H0973 - 0006

Q I want to know whether you have received any orders after November 1937, from which it might be concluded that there were intentions of aggression against any neighboring country in such a manner that you as a commander of troops might suppose that politics had experienced a different changed course or that such change of course might appear at any time?

A No, we have not had anything, nor had our ~~training~~ training course been changed in anyway. The only ~~things~~ is what I have seen here which taught me anything about this conference

Q Are you acquainted with the goals of the Wehrmacht in the Third Reich and what were these aims?

A Of course, I heard about the aims of the Wehrmacht in my capacity as chief of the army training section. I think one would have to tell the chief of the training section these because the training, after all, was the defensive part of the armament. The goal which it tried to achieve was without any double meanting the creation of a Wehrmacht for the protection of the Reich. The officers crops knew without any question that was the reason for the increase of the army. In order not to starve the beginning Germany and in order to avoid a repetition of such events as, for instance, the occupation of the Ruhr, which was a big burden on all of us. I believe that we have done only our

H0973-0007

duty toward our country like every other officer in every country also.

Q Were these aims influenced by party goals?

A The party had no influence on these goals. Perhaps they had put some pressure on us to work. I do not know where from but several times we were approached that the armistice was too heavy and to great a burden. I do not know exactly what the source was for that sort of thing.

Q What was the relationship of the position of the Wehrmacht to the SA?

A The Wehrmacht and SA were entirely separate organizations and as I saw them thus. The SR and SA was unmilitary organi zation. It was not a military organization. However, Rx in the time which is to say the time before the army attempted to take it's own military road, as far as I know Roehm intended to become/Reichsfurhrer SS and organized the SR and the military and that is why the chief of the army, General Von Fritsch rejected any military training of the SA,

Q Were there in existence any other influences or attempts to influence the Wehrmacht?

A I do not believe that there were other influences in the army. I can only testify to the army not the entire Wehrmacht.

Q What was the relationship to the WAffen SS?

H0973-0008

A During the time I was chief of the training section of the army there was no such a thing as the Waffen SS as such. I think it was in 1936 they the organized SS started to organize single battalians of the SS. We, by order of the Reich Minister Von Blomberg had to put our installations, such as engineers and training areas at their disposal. General Von Fritsch and Von Bock both had it within their power to avoid such a situation, to have not granted the SS any training nor the Waffen SS wanted help from us. General Von Fritsch felt correctly that these incompetent things were a competition to the army. Nevertheless, statements were made several times that the army was the only institution to bear arms and the suspicions of Von Fritsch were a mistake, and in the end Von Fritsch was shown to be correct.

Q What was the relationship of the Wehrmacht and the army to the power?

A Not always without friction. There were party members and its leaders who looked with seriousness on it and it was looked on by the people on the basis of a long tradition. On the other hand, there were incidents between the army commanders and the party leaders in the several garrisons and possibly very severe criticism was voiced, particularly by the older commanders in the army. Quite a few incidents emanated from this, which always had to be dealt with again and

H0973-0009

again. As far as I am personally concerned/as a commander of a troop was concerned, I wish to state I had not experienced any major incidents.

Q What was the attitude of the officers' corps toward Hitler?

A I do not believe there was a single officer who did not back up Hitler in his extraordinary successes. Hitler had lead Germany out of it's utmost misery, both politically and in it's foreign politics and economically. Every thought had revealed that and had to stand behind the Fuehrer and patriotism.

Q Now violations against law were becoming very well known?

COLONEL NEAVE: Is that a question.

DR. LATERNSER: We are now speaking about the attitude of the officers' corps toward Hitler and the question is to find out whether this attitude has been changed by the fact that violence and transgressions against the law had become known publicly.

COLONEL NEAVE: I hadn't understood what the question was.

WITNESS:

A During the first period these acts of violence and transgressions against law as we heard about them were debited to the account of heroism and it's accompanying appeals, and because it was heroism.

H0973-0010

Later on we rejected such acts of heroism and transgression against the law.

Q What was the attitude toward the treaty of Versailles?

A We officers in particular felt that the Treaty of Versailles constituted an undue demand on Germany. The general feeling of the officers' corps was that basic parts of it had to be changed.

Q Was that change to be accomplished by war?

A No, for us, particularly veterans of the first world war it was entirely impossible since we were acquainted with the terrors of war. However we, as members of the general staff, had enough records on hand to appreciate the sobriety of arms and the economic situation of the surrounding countries as opposed to poor Germany.

Q What were the attitudes of the officers toward the Polish question? I wish to refer here to a statement submitted by the Prosecution, an affidavit signed by General Oberst Blaskowitz, USA 537. General Blaskowitz in this affidavit stated that the question of the Polish Corridor had to be solved, and if necessary, by the use of arms. He added in his affidavit that this attitude was bad, according to all officers, is that correct?

A First talking about the attitude to the Polish question I believe that the questionof the Polish corridor was one of the most essential points of the Versailles Treaty. This question had to be solved soon. I do not

H0973 - 0011

understand how General Oberst Blaskowitz in connection with this can talk about war. Any one who has experienced one world war on two or three fronts would not risk it again, poor as we were, with a two or three front war. I never heard of any such intention to make war.

Q The officers thought in connection with this problem of the peaceful solution?

A I may say here that we were most hopeful of peaceful solutions, but with the State and ~~xxxxxprinting~~ press printing ads that our enemies too should make certain concessions regarding the Versailles Treaty.

Q Do you know the Denkschrift written by this General Bon Beck?

A I do not know this report but I have heard of it. I do not believe that it was possible to read it for the troop commanders. I know it's contents from the discussions about it and what the records said.

Q In it Colonel General Von Beck stated that Germany could not possibly entertain any thoughts of a two front war.

A I believe that General Beck in his report expressed best the thoughtsof us all. We were also very ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ less colorful, not only militarily, but taking armament ~~xxxxxx~~ production into consideration, that even a one front war ~~xxxx~~ against our heavily armed neighbors would be most difficult,

H0973-0012

and also on two fronts would have been impossible.

Q According to your statements you were a member of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Army twice, from 1927 to 1931, and from 1933 to 1937. You stated previously that you were the chief of the army training section from 1933 to 1937. During the first period of the activity certain decisions of Hitler took place, such as leaving the League of Nations, the Rhineland Occupation, and the declaration of the sovereignty of the army. Now, I have the following question: Did you in your capacity as chief of one of the sections of the General Staff, did you take part in conferences, the aim of which were these decisions?

A No, I have never participated in any such a conference, nor do I know of any such conferences.

Q How were you informed of such decisions?

A I have heard it in general through the League of Nations, through the normal publicity service, and I remember in particular the publicity which was received by the Rhineland occupation. The Chief of the General Staff has called the section chiefs of the General Staff on the day of the occupation of the Rhineland. This conference started: Gentlemen: Two hours ago, two hours ago, the first German troops have marched across the Rhine. I remember this particularly, because at that time we were really astonished that it was possible

H0973-0013

to keep so silent in the ministry and in the supreme command of the army. Even we chiefs of the sections of the General Staff did not know anything about it.

Q Had there arisen through the methods of training a condition that a war might be possible through these events?

A May I illustrate explicitly on this point?

Q Since you were in a key position for this training problem, yes.

A My section was in charge of the entire annual program for the entire army. We had charge of everything Fluge was to undertake during the year, and furthermore it issued directives of special tasks of troops, and we also issued directives for the different training troops, and for assistant leaders and for Commanders. I was in charge of this training program from the years 1933 to 1937, without ever having received during those four years even once a special action on any aggressive intention. The motto which appeared over the directive was "The struggle of the minority against superior forces." I know that resistance, which is the way of fighting of the minority against superiority was the major practice of the army, so that General Von Fritsch took measures in 1936. I have participated in conferences with Com-

H0973-0014

manders and know that he stated, and I mention that, besides the delaying tactics, which only accomplishes a running away of the troops, the holding and counter xx tactics also must be used. We cannot permit in case of an enemy attack the German land to be surrendered without a fight.

Q For four years you were the teacher for assistant leaders?

A From 1927 to 1931.

Q During this training was the special accent put on aggressive philosphy?

A No, there was no special accent on aggressive wars. People were trained in aggressive tactics, and what we taught these commanders in the training courses, the foreign states themselves should very well know. For two years I have had the highest and medium rate Russian leaders as pupils. An American Military Attache was also at my lectures. I think that all of these will be familiar with our training program as we put it into practice. ~~The~~

Q Did other nations participate in such courses?

A I have had Goering as a pupil. After the official re-opening of the war academy I don't know of my own knowledge but I believe that many members of the other states were pupils there.

Q Up to what year did the foreign officers attend the lectures?

H0973-0015

A As far as I know up to and including the year 1939.

Q Were these assistant leaders also schooled politically?

A There were given political lectures. While I was there I had invited General Von Schleicher to talk. Members of the Government party also gave talks to the war ministry. The purpose of these lectures was only to promote the general education in order to be ableto judge correctly the large characters. It was not possible for any special political training to be connected with it because the army and the Wehrmacht were not political.

Q I believe that the preceding witnesses have offered sufficient testimony regarding the Wehrmacht and the increase of the army. When did you become the Commander of the first tank division?

A The fourth tank division, in the fall before 1938, I started to re-organize anew this tank division.

Q Was this tank division at that time ready for war?

A No, not at all. I have created the division from nothing. Equipment from basic units were given to me by other troops and they were so few and they came so slowly that at first the division could not be put up in it's proper style. I was unable to put up a motor-cycle rifle battalion and a panzer korps at first.

H0973 - 0016

I was able to put together with great labor an engineer company. The tank equipment was exceedingly weak. There were almost at first no heavy modern tanks. They were only antiquated weak type of tanks available to me.

Q Was there, taking into consideration a possibly coming Polish campaign, had yourtank division been equipped and organized properly at great speed?

A Not at all. The very difficult work or organizing this division was because a part of this division had to take part in the Czech invasion. Since the division was completely unready in it's strength for this invasion I was able with great difficulty to organize at least a mixed brigade so that I could take part in the invasion of Czecho Slovakia. With great difficulties in the committment and I will say this to all, thank God there was no shooting. After this committment the organization was continued for the Polish campaign without any specific goal known to me but ~~specifically~~ perfectly normal. Until then the order for the committment in the Polish campaign arrived as a surprise. In this committment too the division took part with the motorcycle battalion only, with one engineer company, and again with a great number of antiquated weak tanks.

Q Under these circumstances what was the attitude toward the Polich campaign on your own part and the part of your troops?

H0973-0017

A The troops, men and officers I may say together, felt that a solution of the Polish Corridor problem had become necessary. Besides every one was most impressed ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ by violent measures being taken against German nationals in Poland which were publicized again and again by radio and press, but as a matter of fact no one thought of a war against Poland. Hitler had solved the Austrian and the Czech question without shedding any blood and every one thought the same would be possible with Poland, and granting that into the assembling area suddenly the marching of troops was called, and the general view was that this problem had been solved without any shedding of blood.

Q Which army did you command at the beginning of the Russian campaign?

A I was a Commanding General of the 41st Tank Corps.

Q General were you given a command ---

A In March 1942 I had the ~~Third~~ Tank Army. Before that it was called a tank group. I was a commander from the beginning of October 1941.

Q As Commander in Chief of the Third Tank Army did you have a SD Commando under you?

A No sir, such a detachment was part of it in an administrative/economic sense.

H0973 - 0018

COLONEL NEAVE: Ask the witness to clarify that ~~question.~~ answer. He said he did not have an SD commando under him but that it was attached to him in an economic sense. I don't understand it.

DR. LATERNSER: I shall explain that in the next question.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q What do we understand by that economic sense?

A The economic attachment here means the care and missions of water and food.

COLONEL NEAVE: You asked him if it was under his command/and he said "no."

DR. LATERNSER: The next question will clarify it.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q Who issued orders to the SD commando?

A The Reichsfuhrer SS was the only authority that issued orders to the SD and circumscribed their activities. We were not permitted to issue orders regarding this committment.

Q Your statements conflict with the statements of the SS Fuhrer Olandorf and conflict with the statements of the Police General and the Waffen SS General both. These witnesses stated that technically and administratively this was in every possible way subordinate to the Commander Group.

H0973-0019

A These statements are false.

Q You stated previously that orders to the SD Commando were issued by the Reichsführer of the SS. Were you made acquainted with the contents of these orders?

A No sir, the SD remained silent.

Q Do you know anything about the ~~xxxxxx~~ murders with which the SD is charged?

A No sir, during the war I ~~xxxx~~ heard of mass murders only in regard to the ghettos and I have heard of the suppression of the insurrection of the Warsaw ghetto. I have heard nothing of mass murder otherwise.

Q Due to the SD commandos being attached in an economic way to your troops did you have any possibility to exercise any influence on the activities of this SD Commando?

A I did not have that possibility since I was never made acquainted and never heard what they did. Incidentally, I believe that within the favor of an army, the SD commando had very little effect.

Q Why?

A Because within my area of operations I was sole commander and the SD commando had no business.

Q A document which has been submitted says that the leaders of an Einsatzgruppe A had particularly friendly relations with General Hoppner, do you know of the sector General Hoppner was in?

H0973-0020

A At the beginning of the Russian campaign General Hoppner was the leader of my tank division. He was coming from the East Prussian area in the general direction of Leningrad.

Q Do you know anything about the Einsatzgruppe A which was committed to the Leningrad sector.

A No, nothing is known to me about this Einsatzgruppe A, because I had here to advance with a tank group. We had an entirely different task than to worry about the SD in the rear.

Q The Commander in Chief of an Army, his day, I assume is plenty filled with military tasks which were essential while advancing?

A It took night and day in order to fulfill our tasks and then if one spends all day with one's troops in the front lines, there are reports to be worked on pertaining to the troops, and one divests oneself of whatever is unessential for this life.

XXXXXX DR. LATERNSER: This chapter has been finished now and I don't want to go into another chapter.

COLONEL NEAVE: I think we will adjourn now until Monday morning.

The Commission adjourned at 1300.

Com A
Take 3, page 15
Cook
1200 - 1300
22 June 1946
Reinhardt

H0973-0021

The foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the testimony of GENERAL OBERST HANS REINHARDT, taken on 22 June 1946.

Alice Mackow
Reporter (p 1-4)

Basil Cook
Reporter (p 5-19)

Reporter (p)

CERTIFIED TO:

Commissioner

Commissioner

H0973 - 0022

Official transcript of testimony for the defense of organizations, taken before a Commission appointed by the International Military Tribunal pursuant to paragraph 4 of the order of the Tribunal dated 13 March 1946.

22 June 1946

(The COMMISSION CONVENED AT 1130 HOURS)

COMMISSIONER:

Colonel A.M.S. Neave

O.K.W.

LT. GENERAL HANS REINHARDT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:

COLONEL NEAVE: What is your name?

THE WITNESS: Hans Reinhardt.

COLONEL NEAVE: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath)

COLONEL NEAVE: You may sit down.

Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal have not yet made a decision on the point you mentioned just now. I understand they will discuss it this afternoon.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

COLONEL NEAVE: Dr. Laternser, you can tell us what this witness is going to bring out. Do you have a copy of the application now?

DR. LATERNSER: I wish to interrogate the witnesson the following:

1) The military leaders did not agree with the aims of the NSDAP .

2) They took no part in the preparation of aggressive wars.

3) There was no conspiracy or participation in crimes as given in Article 6.

4) It was impossible to resign or to alter the system.

DR. KEMPNER: Mr. Commissioner, I want to raise the question of cumulative evidence. This is exactly the third time that we have interrogated witnesses about the same topics. We had the same statements in the case of Field Marshall Von Rundstedt, General von Leib and this witness.

COLONEL NEAVE: Thank you for bringing up this point here, Dr. Kempner, as I was just going to raise it myself.

DR. LATERNSER: It cannot be said in advance whether evidence is cumulative or not.

COLONEL NEAVE: The question I am asking you is this. Is this witness going to bring out entirely new aspects of the matters which you say you wish to prove and is he not going to repeat what the others said?

DR. LATERNSER: Not at all, Mr. Commissioner. The answer to the question whether the evidence is cumulative can only be decided as to every individual question.

COLONEL NEAVE: I am simply asking you a question. Of course, you are right but the matters you state the witness will bring out have been covered before. If this witness is going to draw attention to an entirely new aspect of the same matter, then of course, the commission will hear him. Please bearin mind that we have only two weeks longer for the hearings.

DR. LATERNSER: Please judge each individual question.

COLONEL NEAVE: Yes.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q Witness, what was your last grade in service?

A General.

Q Were you a member of the General Staff?

A Yes.

Q What was your function?

A I joined the General Staff during the first World War in 1916. I then was a member of the General Staff until the end of the World War. I then alternated between duty with the General Staff and on the front. Twice I was with the General Staff with the OKH in Berlin. From 1927 to 1931 I was a teacher and thedirector of the training course for assistant leaders. From 1933 to 1937 I was the chief of the Army Training Section in the Supreme Commander ofthe Army. Since 1937, I was no longer a member of the General Staff.

Q What was your function in the Polish campaign?

A I was a commander of the 4th Panzer Tank Division.

Q What wasyour rank?

A At that time the rank was Major General.

Q When did you become Commander in Chief?

H0973-0023

H0973-0024

A In March, 1942, I became the commander of the 3rd Panzer Tank Army.

Q What was your last function ?

A On the 16th of August, 1944, I was charged with the commanding job of Army Group Center. From this function, I was deposed in January 1945. Since then I have not been in active service.

Q While you were in the supreme command of the army or later when you had command of troops, did you become acquainted with any unified aggressive plans of the Fuehrer ?

A No, never.

Q Did you hear by any chance from conversation of such transactions ?

A No.

Q What was your position in November of 1937 ?

A In November of 1937 I was the commander of the Rifle Brigade of the First Tank Division.

Q As you know, Hitler called a conference in the beginning of November, 1937, with the commanders of the different army groups. Hitler presented his plans for the future to the commanders.

I want to know whether you have received any orders after November 1937, from which it might be concluded that there were intentions of aggression against any neighboring country in such a manner that you as a commander of troops might suppose that politics had experienced a different changed course or that such change of course might appear at any time ?

A No, we have not had anything, nor had our training course been changed in anyway. The only thing is what I have seen here which taught me anything about this conference.

Q Are you acquainted with the goals of the Wehrmacht in the Third Reich and what were these aims ?

A Of course, I heard about the aims of the Wehrmacht in my capacity as chief of the army training section. I think one would have to tell the chief of the training section these because the training, after all, was the defensive part of the armament. The goal which it tried to achieve was without any double meanting the creation of a Wehrmacht for the protection of the Reich. The officers crops knew without any question that was the reason for the increase of the army. In order not to starve the beginning Germany and in order to avoid a repetition of such events as, for instance, the occupation of

the Ruhr, which was a big burden on all of us. I believe that we have done only our duty toward our country like every other officer in every country also.

Q Were these aims influenced by party goals ?

A The party had no influence on these goals. Perhaps they had put some pressure on us to work. I do not know where from but several times we were approached that the armistice was too heavy and to great a burden. I do not know exactly what the source was for that sort of thing.

Q What was the relationship of the position of the Wehrmacht to the SA ?

A The Wehrmacht and SA were entirely separate organizations and as I saw them thus. The SR and SA was unmilitary organization. It was not a military organization. However, in the time which is to say the time before the army attempted to take it's own military road, as far as I know Roehm intended to become Reichsfurhrer SS and organized the SR and the military and that is why the chief of the army , General Von Fritsch rejected any military training of the SA.

Q Were there in existence any other influences or attempts to influence the Wehrmacht ?

A I do not believe that there were other influences in the army. I can only testify to the army not the entire Wehrmacht.

H0973-0025

Q What was the relationship to the Waffen SS ?

A During the time I was chief of the training section of the army there was no such a thing as the Waffen SS as such. I think it was in 1936 that the organized SS started to organize single battalians of the SS. We, by order of the Reich Minister Von Blomberg had to put our installations, such as engineers and training areas at their disposal. General Von Fritsch and Von Bock both had it within their power to avoid such a situation, to have not granted the SS any training nor the Waffen SS who wanted help from us. General Von Fritsch felt correctly that these incompetent things were a competition to the army. Nevertheless, statements were made several times that the army was the only institution to bear arms and the suspicions of Von Fritsch were a mistake, and in the end Von Fritsch was shown to be correct.

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A Not always without friction. There were party members and its leaders who looked with seriousness on it and it was looked on by the people on the

basis of a long tradition. On the other hand, there were incidents between the army commanders and the party leaders in the several garrisons and possibly very severe criticism was voiced, particularly by the older commanders in the army. Quite a few incidents emanated from this, which always had to be dealt with again and again. As far as I am personally concerned as a commander of a troop was concerned, I wish to state I had not experienced any major incidents.

Q What was the attitude of the officers' corps toward Hitler ?

A I do not believe there was a single officer who did not back up Hitler in his extraordinary successes. Hitler had lead Germany out of it's utmost misery, both politically and in it's foreign politics and economically. Every thought had revealed that and had to stand behind the Fuehrer and patriotism.

Q Now violations against law were becoming very well known ?

COLONEL NEAVE : Is that a question.

DR. LATERNSER : We are now speaking about the attitude of the officers' corps toward Hitler and the question is to find out whether this attitude has been changed by the fact that violence and transgressions against the law had become known publicly.

COLONEL NEAVE : I hadn't understood what the question was.

WITNESS :

A During the first period these acts of violence and transgressions against law as we heard about them were debited to the account of heroism and it's accompanying appeals, and because it was heroism.

H0973 - 0026

Later on we rejected such acts of heroism and transgression against the law.

Q What was the attitude toward the treaty of Versailles ?

A We officers in particular felt that the Treaty of Versailles constituted an undue demand on Germany. The general feeling of the officers'corps was that basic parts of it had to be changed.

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A No, for us, particularly veterans of the first world war it was entirely impossible since we were acquainted with the terrors of war. However we, as members of the general staff, had enough records on hand to appreciate the sobriety of arms and the economic situation of the surrounding countries as opposed to poor Germany.

Q What were the attitudes of the officers toward the Polish question ? I wish to refer here to a statement submitted by the Prosecution, an affidavit signed by General Oberst Blaskowitz, USA 537. General Blaskowitz in this affidavit stated that the question of the Polish Corridor had to be solved, and if necessary, by the use of arms. He added in his affidavit that this attitude was bad, according to all officers, is that correct ?

A First talking about the attitude to the Polish question I believe that the question of the Polish corridor was one of the most essential points of the Versailles Treaty. This question had to be solved soon. I do not understand how General Oberst Blaskowitz in connection with this can talk about war Any one who has experienced one world war on two or three fronts would not risk it again, poor as we were, with a two or three front war. I never heard of any such intention to make war.

Q The officers thought in connection with this problem of the peaceful solution ?

A I may say here that we were most hopeful of peaceful solutions, but with the State and press printing adds that our enemies too should make certai concessions regarding the Versailles Treaty.

Q Do you know the Denkschrift written by this General Von Beck ?

A I do not know this report but I have heard of it. I do not believe th it was possible to read it for the troop commanders. I know it's contents fro the discussions about it and what the records said.

Q In it Colonel General Von Beck stated that Germany could not possibly entertain any thoughts of a two front war.

H0973 – 0027

A I believe that General Beck in his report expressed best the thoughts of us all. We were also very less colorful, not only militarily, but taking armament production into consideration, that even a one front war against our heavily armed neighbours would be most difficult, and also on two fronts would have been impossible.

Q According to your statements you were a member of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Army twice, from 1927 to 1931, and from 1933 to 1937. You stated previously that you were the chief of the army training section from 1933 to 1937. During the first period of the activity certain decisions of Hitler took place, such as leaving the League of Nations, the Rhineland Occupation, and the declaration of the soverignty of the army. Now, I have the following question : Did you in your capacity as chief of one of the sections of the General Staff, did you take part in conferences, the aim of which were these decisions ?

A No, I have never participated in any such a conference, nor do I know of any such conferences.

Q How were you informed of such decisions ?

A I have heard it in general through the League of Nations, through the normal publicity service, and I remember in particular the publicity which was received by the Rhineland occupation. The Chief of the General Staff has called the section chiefs of the General Staff on the day of the occupation of the Rhineland. This conference started : Gentlemen : Two hours ago, two hour ago, the first German troops have marched across the Rhine. I remember this particularly, because at that time we were really astonished that is was possible.

H0973 - 0028

H0973 - 0029

to keep so silent in the ministry and in the supreme command of the army. Ever we chiefs of the sections of the General Staff did not know anything about it.

Q Had there arisen through the methods of training a condition that a war might be possible through these events?

A May I illustrate explicitly on this point?

Q Since you were in a key position for this training problem, yes.

A My section was in charge of the entire annual program for the entire army. We had charge of everything Fluge was to undertake during the year, and furthermore it issued directives of special tasks of troops, and we also issued directives for the different training troops, and for assistant leaders and for Commanders. I wasin charge of this training program from the years 1933 to 1937, without ever having received during those four years even once a special action on any aggressive intention. The motto which appeared over the directi was "The struggle of the minority against superior forces." I know that resistance, which is the way of fighting of the minority against superiority was the major practice of the army, so that General von Fritsch took measures in 1936. I have participated in conferences with Commanders and know that he stated, and I mention that, besides the delaying tactics, which only accomplishe a running away of the troops, the holding and counter tactics also must be used. We cannot permit in case of an enemy attack the German land to be surrendered without a fight.

Q For four years you were the teacher for assistant leaders?

A From 1927 to 1931.

Q During this training was the special accent put on aggressive philosop

A No, there was no special accent on aggressive wars. People were trained in aggressive tactics, and what we taught these commanders in the training courses, the foreign states themselves should very well know. For two years I have had the highest and medium rate Russian leaders as pupils. An American Military Attache was also at my lectures. I think that all of these will be familiar with our training program as we put it into practice.

Q Did other nations participate in such courses?

A I have had Goering as a pupil. After the official re-opening of the war academy I don't know of my own knowledge but I believe that many members of

H0973-0030

other states were pupils there.

Q Up to what year did the foreign officers attend the lectures?

A As far as I know up to and including the year 1939.

Q Were these assistant leaders also schooled politically?

A There were given political lectures. While I was there I had invited General von Schleicher to talk. Members of the Government party also gave talks to the war ministry. The purpose of these lectures was only to promote the general education in order to be able to judge correctly the large characters. It was not possible for any special political training to be connected with it because the army and the Wehrmacht were not political.

Q I believe that the preceding witnesses have ordered sufficient testimony regarding the Wehrmacht and the increase of the army. When did you become the Commander of the first tank division?

A The fourth tank division, in the fall before 1938, I started to re-organize anew this tank division.

Q Was this tank division at that time ready for war?

A No, not at all. I have created the division from nothing. Equipment from basic units was given to me by other troops and they were so few and they came so slowly that at first the division could not be put up in its proper style. I was unable to put up a motor-cycle rifle battalion and a panzer corps at first. I was able to put together with great labor an engineer company. The tank equipment was exceedingly weak. There were almos at first no heavy modern tanks. They were only antiquated weak type of tanks available to me.

Q Was there, taking into consideration a possibly coming Polish campaig had your tank division been equipped and organized properly at great speed?

A Not at all. The very difficult work or organizing this division was because a part of this division had to take part in the Czech invasion. Sinc the division was completely unready in its strength for this invasion I was able with great difficulty to organize at least a mixed brigade so that I could take part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. With great difficulties in the commitment and I will say this to all, thank God there was no shooting. After this commitment the organization was continued for the Polish campaign without

H0973-0031

sny specific goal known to me but perfectly normal. Until then the order for the commitment in the Polish campaign arrived as a surprise. In this commitment too the division took part with the motorcycle battalion only, with one engineer company, and again with a great number of antiquated weak tanks.

Q Under these circumstances what was the attitude toward the Polish campaign on your own part and the part of your troops?

H0973-0032

A. The troops, men and officers I may say together, felt that a solution of the Polish Corridor problem had become necessary. Besides every one was most impressed by violent measures being taken against German nationals in Poland which were publicized again and again by radio and press, but as a matter of fact no one thought of a war against Poland. Hitler had solved the Austrian and the Czech question without shedding any blood and every on thought the same would be possible with Poland, and granting that into the assembling area suddenly the marching of troops was called, and the genera view was that this problem had been solved without any shedding of blood.

Q. Which army did you command at the beginning of the Russian campaign ?

A. I was a commanding General of the 41st Tank Corps.

Q. General were you given a command --

A. In March 1942 I had the Third Tank Army. Before that it was called a tank group. I was a commander from the beginning of October 1941.

Q. As Commander in Chief of the Third Tank Army did you have a SD Commando under you ?

A. No sir, such a detachment was part of it in an administrative and economic sense.

COLONEL NEAVE: Ask the witness to clarify that answer. He said he did not have an SD commando under him but that it was attached to him in a economic sense. I don't understand it.

DR. LATERNSER: I shall explain that in the next question.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q. What do we understand by that economic sense ?

A. The economic attachment here means the care and missions of water a food.

COLONEL NEAVE: You asked him if it was under his command and he sa "no".

DR. LATERNSER: The next question will clarify it.

BY DR. LATERNSER:

Q. Who issued orders to the SD commando ?

A. The Reichsfuhrer SS was the only authority that issued orders to th SD and circumscribed their activities. We were not permitted to issue or ders regarding this committment.

H0973-0033

Q. Your statements conflict with the statements of the SS Führer Olandor and conflict with the statements of the Police General and the Waffen SS General both. These witnesses stated that technically and administratively this was in every possible way subordinate to the Commander Group.

A. These statements are false.

Q. You stated previously that orders to the SD Commando were issued by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS. Were you made acquainted with the contents of these orders ?

A. No sir, the SD remained silent.

Q. Do you know anything about the murders with which the SD is charged ?

A. No sir, during the war I heard of mass murders only in regard to the ghettos and I have heard of the suppression of the insurrection of the Warsaw ghetto. I have heard nothing of mass murder otherwise.

Q. Due to the SD commandos being attached in an economic way to your tr did you have any possibility to exercise any influence on the activities o this SD Commando ?

A. I did not have that possibility since I was never made acquainted an never heard what they did. Incidentally I believe that within the favor of an army, the SD commando had very little effect.

Q. Why ?

A. Because within my area of operations I was sole commander and the SD commando had no business.

Q. A document which has been submitted says that the leaders of an Einsatzgruppe A had particularly friendly relations with General Hoeppner, do you know of the sector General Hoeppner was in ?

A. At the beginning of the Russian campaign General Hoeppner was the leader of my tank division. He was coming from the East Prussian area in the general direction of Leningrad.

Q. Do you know anything about the Einsatzgruppe A which was committed to the Leningrad sector.

A. No, nothing is known to me about this Einsatzgruppe A. because I had here to advance with a tank group. We had an entirely different task than to worry about the SD in the rear.

H0973-0034

Q. The Commander in Chief of an Army, his day, I assume is plenty filled with military tasks which were essential while advancing ?

A. It took night and day in order to fulfill our tasks and then if one sp all da with one's troops in the front lines, there are reports to be worked on pertaining to the troops, and one divests oneself of whatever is unessenti for this life.

DR. LATERNSER: This chapter has been finished now and I don't want t go into another chapter.

COLONEL NEAVE: I think we will adjourn now until monday morning.

(The Commission adjourned at 1300 hours.)

The foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the testimony of GENERAL OBERST HANS REINHARDT, taken on 22 June 194[illegible].

Alice MEEHAN
reporter

Rose W. COOK
reporter

reporter

CERTIFIED TO :

A.M.S. NEAVE
Commissioner

Commissioner